The MMRCA saga: lessons for Russia

In April 2015, the 15-year-long saga of the Indian tender to procure 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for the national air force arrived at an interim arrangement. Paradoxical as it may sound, this arrangement actually improves Russia’s chances on the Indian arms market. Having failed to reach a mutually acceptable compromise with France on the particularities of license-building 108 Dassault Rafale fighters (this type officially won the contest in 2012), the Indian Air Force (IAF) decided to buy 36 such warplanes directly from the manufacturer. Although not optimal, under the circumstances this decision appears the least bad way out of the tight corner in which India has found itself because of its unwieldy procurement-related bureaucratic procedures.

The project currently known as the MMRCA tender was started in 2000 with the idea buying 126 Mirage 2000 fighters from the manufacturer without any contest procedure at all. The type had performed commendably on the Indian side in the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan. New Delhi’s primary motive was to secure enough efficient warplanes for the IAF to keep its strength at 44 squadrons or more. However, the program eventually transformed into an international contest, in which the Russian MiG-35 also ran, and the motives also became more complex. Apart from purely military objectives, MMRCA now pursued the goal of obtaining new aviation technology (it appears that the idea was initially to go for non- Russian technology) and provide the national manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) with work following the completion of the program to license-build Russian Sukhoi Su- 30MKI fighters. Inevitably, this complex and far-reaching project also had a political dimension.